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Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) hold
promise for many beneficial
applications. However, there have
been concerns and calls for a
moratorium raised over “mounting
evidence” that CNT may be the
“new asbestos,”1 or at least
deserving of “special toxicological
attention” due to prior experiences
with asbestos.2 The shape and size
of some agglomerated CNTs are
similar to asbestos—the most
“desirable.” And because CNTs for
structural utility are long and
thin—characteristics thought to
impart increased potency to
asbestos fibers—discussions of
parallels between these two
substances are natural. Thus, given
the legacy of asbestos-related
injury and the thousands of cases
litigated each year, consideration of
possible implications of the use of
CNTs in research and in consumer
products is prudent.
First reported in 19913, CNTs
epitomize the emerging field of
nanotechnology, defined by some
as the “ability to measure, see,
manipulate, and manufacture
things usually between 1 and
100 nanometers.”4 CNTs are a type
of carbon-based engineered
nanoparticle generally formed by
Uniting Plaintiff, Defense, Insurance, and Corporate Counsel to
Advance the Civil Justice System
Fall 2009
Toxic Torts and Environmental
Law Committee
IN THIS ISSUE
Carbon Nanotubes: The Next Asbestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Editor’s Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tatera v. FMC Corporation: When Is A Product No A Product? . . . 3
Mexico’s National Wastes Management Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Environmental Risk During Restructuring And Bankruptcy . . . . . 5
Upcoming TTEL Programs And Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Limitations Of Toxicogenomic Studies To Assess Toxic Exposures
And Injury From Benzene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Burlington Northern: The Requisite Intent For Arranger Liability
Under Cercla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2009-2010 TIPS Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Continued on page 18
CommitteeNews
CARBON NANOTUBES: THE NEXT ASBESTOS?
Fionna Mowat, Exponent, fmowat@exponent.com
Joyce Tsuji, Exponent, tsujij@exponent.com
1 Miller, G. 2008. Mounting evidence that carbon
nanotubes may be the new asbestos. Friends of the
Earth Australia. Available at http://nano.foe.org.au.
2 The Royal Society and Royal Academy of
Engineering (RS/RAE). 2004. Nanoscience and
nanotechnologies. Royal Society and Royal Association
of Engineers. London: The Royal Society. Available at
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/.
3 Iijima, S. 1991. Helical microtubules of graphitic
carbon. Nature (London) 354:56–58.
4 National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
2007. The National Nanotechnology Initiative. Strategic
Plan. Washington DC: NSTC, Committee on
Technology, Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science,
Engineering, and Technology. December. Available at
http://www.nano.gov/ NNI_Strategic_Plan_2004.pdf.
A gaping question in free speech 
law surrounds the application of 
the First Amendment defense in 
business torts.  The pervasiveness 
of communication technologies, 
the flourishing of privacy law, 
and the mere passage of time 
have precipitated an escalation in tort cases in which 
communication, and what the defendant may allege is 
free speech, lies at the heart of the matter.
WikiLeaks a  the “Streisand Effect”
Consider for example Bank Julius Baer & Co. 
v. WikiLeaks,2 a civil claim in the U.S. D st ict Court 
of the Northern District of California, ultimately 
abandoned by the plaintiff when jurisdiction over 
the defendant became a practically insurmountable 
problem.  WikiLeaks (lately in the news for the court-
martial of its source, so dier Chelsea Manning) is the 
web provider that earned worldwide fame, or infamy, 
depe ding whom you ask, for publication of leaked 
records implicating controversial U.S. conduct in the 
wars in the Middle East.  WikiLeaks and its one-time 
U.S.-based Internet service provider, Dynadot, were 
sued by Swiss-based Bank Julius Baer (“Baer Bank”) 
after WikiLeaks posted records that revealed customer 
information and questionable business practices in the 
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bank’s Cayman Islands branch.  The records identified 
multiple accountholders, and critics of the bank asserted 
that the records contained evidence of wrongdoing, 
including money laundering.
Baer Bank sued WikiLeaks for, inter alia, tortious 
interference with contract and with prospective 
economic advantage, violation of unfair competition 
law, and conversion.  The bank sought and obtained 
a permanent injunction from the court to shut down 
the WikiLeaks domain “wikileaks.org,” maintained 
by Dynadot; WikiLeaks did not appear in the case. 
Recognizing the threat of an injunction in U.S. courts, 
websites around the world mirrored wikileaks.org. 
The leaked information could not be contained by the 
court injunction, and Baer Bank learned a lesson on the 
“Streisand effect,” by which efforts to remove online 
information inadvertently multiply the dissemination 
(named for diva Barbara’s backfired effort to suppress 
aerial photographs of her opulent coastal home).   Faced 
with an outcry from free expression advocates and the 
effective mootness of its order, the court dissolved the 
injunction.
Had Baer Bank gone forward, a central question 
would have been the viability of the First Amendment as 
a shield against tort claims with little or no resemblance 
to their mundane brethren, defamation and privacy.  As 
a federal constitutional right, the First Amendment must 
trump state tort theories, whether common law, such as 
conversion, or statutory, such as unfair competition and 
trade secret appropriation.  But that’s so only when the 
First Amendment comes into play.  And even when in 
play, the First Amendment is not necessarily a trump card.
New Variation on an Old Question
While the electronic-era glamor of the WikiLeaks 
problem is new, the tort-and-First Amendment question 
is not.  The problem is not unlike that of the case famous 
in journalism circles recounted in Vanity Fair in 1996 
and dramatized in the 1999 movie, The Insider.  CBS 
feared a lawsuit by tobacco giant Brown & Williamson 
over an investigation by the broadcast newsmagazine 60 
Minutes into damaging allegations by scientist Jeffrey 
Wigand about smoking and public health.   Brown & 
Williamson later did sue Wigand, a former employee, 
asserting theft, fraud, breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, and appropriation of 
trade secret.  But Brown & Williamson never did sue 
CBS for its re-publication of Wigand’s assertions.  In 
a classic Insider scene, a CBS lawyer (Gina Gershon) 
endeavored to explain “tortious interference” to 60 
Minutes staff, including Mike Wallace (Christopher 
Plummer).  A perplexed producer (Philip Baker Hall) 
responded for the journalists, “Interfering? That’s what 
we do.”  The possibility of interference liability for CBS 
in the Insider case was cause for much handwringing 
in journalism and civil liberties communities, and the 
question never has been resolved definitively.
Well-known is the expansion of the First Amendment 
as a defense to defamation and false light invasion of 
privacy in the civil rights era, first through the seminal 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan3—which celebrates its 
fiftieth anniversary in 2014—and then through Time, 
Inc. v. Hill4 in 1967 (false light) and Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.5 in 1974 (defamation of public figures). 
In Hustler v. Falwell,6 the case beloved by media law 
students of Larry Flynt’s fun at the Reverend Jerry 
Falwell’s expense, the Supreme Court extended the First 
Amendment defense to a claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress accomplished by parody.  The 
Court signaled its unwillingness to have the Sullivan 
doctrine subverted by an alternative theory in tort when 
the gravamen of the alleged wrong still was reputational 
injury.  But the High Court then and since has provided 
little guidance on exactly how and when such aversion 
of subversion is to be accomplished.
From a First Amendment perspective, allegations of 
tort liability may be viewed as along a spectrum.  On one 
end are classic tort cases of physical injury, such as battery 
in a bar fight or negligence in a car accident.  Those cases 
do not implicate the First Amendment at all.  No court 
applies heightened scrutiny before entering a jury verdict. 
On the other end are those cases that directly implicate 
expression as the civil wrong, namely, defamation and its 
close relation (too close, say jurisdictions that reject it), 
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Had Baer Bank gone forward, a central question would 
have been the viability of the First Amendment as a 
shield against tort claims with little or no resemblance to 
their mundane brethren, defamation and privacy. 
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false light invasion of privacy.  While the First Amendment 
formally operates as an affirmative defense in such 
cases, the legal landscape has been so overwhelmingly 
constitutionalized that only in the rarest private-figure-
plaintiff, non-media-defendant case might federal and 
state constitutional questions go unmentioned.
While the notion of a spectrum is sometimes helpful, 
it breaks down quickly upon close scrutiny, as myriad 
problems defy simple classification.  Often cited in 
this vein are cases of “imitative violence,” or inspired 
wrongdoing, such as violent crimes said to be inspired 
by the movie Natural Born Killers.  Such cases, in 
which the operative theory usually is the general tort of 
negligence, were cataloged masterfully by Andrew B. 
Sims in a 1992 law review article.7  While Sims might 
today add more cases to his rubric, the fundamental 
liability problems persist, including the cloudiness of the 
First Amendment defense.  The plaintiff’s perspective 
focuses on the outcome, the physical injury, to say 
that such cases are more like the car crash.  But from 
the defendant’s perspective, the only alleged wrong is 
expression, so the cases seem more like defamation.  As 
Sims’s survey showed, the analyses in such cases vary 
almost as much as the facts.  I hypothesize moreover that 
the outcomes wax and wane with the civil-libertarian 
inclinations of the courts.  What is clear is a lack of 
consensus about how to resolve the problem.
The interference tort, as well as its close relatives 
unfair competition and trade secret appropriation, plays 
along the same line.  Interference can be accomplished by 
conduct that is at best minimal, or blunt, in its expressive 
quality, as when an organized crime syndicate beats up 
a business owner who refuses to pay protection money. 
Facing criminal charges or a civil suit, the perpetrators 
will make little headway claiming a First Amendment 
right to communicate their message.  At the same 
time, interference is often accomplished by conduct of 
predominantly expressive quality, as when a defendant 
accuses a business owner of fraud so as to cause the 
business to fail.  The plaintiff business owner will face 
a First Amendment defense, and its appropriateness 
is bolstered by the overlap between interference and 
defamation theories on the facts.
The conduct-cum-expression of the web outlet that 
thrives on leaked corporate secrets exemplifies the 
problem.  To the corporate plaintiff, the publisher looks 
like nothing more than an accessory after the fact of a 
crime, a receiver of stolen goods who seeks thereby to 
profit.  Meanwhile the publisher-defendant sees itself as 
a journalistic actor in the heroic tradition of Woodward 
and Bernstein, sporting an unprecedented fidelity to 
freedom-of-information absolutism.  To say that the 
plaintiff and defendant disagree over whether the First 
Amendment applies understates their conflict.
Potential Theories and a Prediction for the Future
In recent years, a range of theories has emerged 
to address the problem.  At one end of the range, the 
First Amendment arguably has no application.  Indeed, 
many cases in interference and unfair competition 
law are resolved in comfortable avoidance of the First 
Amendment problem, because the common law already 
builds free speech into the equation.  Interference and 
unfair competition require that defendant’s conduct 
have been “improper,” or “unfair,” and the defendant 
moreover is entitled to assert privilege or justification, 
which includes ordinary business competition, in 
defense.  If the defendant is a journalistic entity and not 
in direct competition with the plaintiff, those facts weigh 
in the defendant’s favor.  The anti-constitutionalization 
position asserts that these common law formulae already 
sufficiently safeguard free speech in business tort cases. 
Support for this position can be found in the Branzburg 
v. Hayes8 doctrine of journalist non-exceptionalism, 
played out in cases such as Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.9 
and Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,10 which 
bound journalists like anyone else to their promises 
in contract and employment law.  The likely but not 
yet certain acceptance by the U.S. Supreme Court of 
liability for invasion of privacy by disclosure in state 
tort law also lends important support here, as the tort 
posits liability for truthful utterances despite the sanctity 
of truthfulness embodied in Sullivan burden-shifting.
7   Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting from Media Speech: A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 231, 235-55 (1992). 
8   408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9   501 U.S. 663 (1991).
10   194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999).
The conduct-cum-expression of the web outlet that 
thrives on leaked corporate secrets exemplifies the 
problem.  To the corporate plaintiff, the publisher looks 
like nothing more than an accessory after the fact of a 
crime . . . .  Meanwhile the publisher-defendant sees 
itself as a journalistic actor in the heroic tradition of 
Woodward and Bernstein . . . .
Media, Privacy and Defamation Law Committee Newsletter    Winter 2014
13 13
At the other end of the range, free speech absolutists 
posit that the First Amendment more or less bars 
liability when the alleged civil wrong is predominantly 
journalistic speech.  This position accords with the anti-
subversion principle of Hustler v. Falwell.  Moreover, 
some courts have gotten hung up on remedies, drawn 
back to this position when their injunctive orders ran 
aground on the rule against prior restraints, à la Pentagon 
Papers.11  Some support for this position also comes 
from Bartnicki v. Vopper, in which the Court protected 
truthful disclosure after balancing the public interest in 
a broadcast about a high-profile labor dispute against 
the government interest in wiretap laws.12  Though 
Bartnicki was a balancing, the heavy weight afforded 
truth suggests a kinship to the Sullivan doctrine.  Despite 
the Branzburg-inspired dichotomy of journalistic 
conduct and expression, Professors Anthony L. Fargo 
and Laurence B. Alexander made a compelling case for 
First Amendment protection of newsgathering in a 2009 
law review article,13 which countered the hegemony of 
Cohen v. Cowles.
A middle-ground position, and one I believe the 
Court likely in time to adopt despite the balancing 
example of Bartnicki, is intermediate scrutiny. 
Rehnquist suggested intermediate scrutiny in a separate 
opinion in Bartnicki, and the lower court had employed 
it.  Intermediate scrutiny occasionally has been called 
on to resolve cases in the imitative violence family, 
where the First Amendment runs up against general 
negligence and causation in the personal injury system, 
and intermediate scrutiny has an established track record 
for testing injunctions.  The theory is straightforward. 
The First Amendment already has the intermediate-
scrutiny doctrine of United States v. O’Brien14 to deal 
with the problem of free expression and generally 
applicable laws.  Thus intermediate scrutiny may be 
employed to test any liability upon mere expression or 
predominantly expressive conduct, whether the liability 
arises in general negligence, unfair competition, trade 
secret appropriation, or breach of fiduciary duty.
Intermediate scrutiny is an elegant solution, but 
not one that satisfies the media defense bar.  The state-
interest prong of intermediate scrutiny is easily satisfied 
upon extant bodies of tort precedent.  And the narrow 
tailoring prong, while arguably well suited to constrain 
the potentially vast scope of injunctive remedy, might 
seem too much to submit free speech to the predilections 
of the courts and the times.  Mitigating such skepticism, 
the at-least-formal process of a presumption-and-rebuttal 
approach, with the civil plaintiff bearing the burden to 
demonstrate the government interest, should be more 
speech-protective than a bare balancing, and certainly is 
preferable to the Branzburg-Cohen doctrine.
Conclusion
Many other issues come into play in business tort 
liability for a media defendant, including and beyond the 
uncharted First Amendment waters.  In the online age, 
jurisdiction presents a troublesome threshold problem 
for plaintiffs.  On the far end of the case, remedy 
and enforcement tender equally thorny deterrents to 
litigation.  Then the whole picture is complicated by 
evolving international norms, especially in privacy, 
which are driving changes in domestic law and even 
constitutional interpretation.  Still, with burgeoning 
channels of communication increasingly accessible to 
soapbox publishers, business torts and free speech will 
only become more entangled. 
11   New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
12   532 U.S. 514 (2001).
13   Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence B. Alexander, Testing the Boundaries of the First Amendment Press Clause: A Proposal for Protecting the Media from Newsgathering Torts, 32 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1093, 1101 (2009).
14   391 U.S. 367 (1968).
